The Financial Conduct Authority has revoked the regulatory bans imposed on four former traders after the Court of Appeal overturned the criminal convictions on which the regulator had relied.
Colin Bermingham, Philippe Moryoussef, Jonathan Mathew and Christian Bittar are affected by the decision. The FCA said it had also removed the associated Final Notices from its public channels and would take no further action against the four in relation to this matter.
A regulatory consequence of the appeal decisions
The step follows a review by the FCA of its own action after the Court of Appeal rulings. The regulator’s explanation is narrow but important: the convictions formed the basis for its bans. Once those convictions had been overturned, it withdrew the bans and removed the notices connected with them.
That does not turn the FCA announcement into a general finding about every aspect of the long-running benchmark-rate cases. It records a specific regulatory consequence of the appeal decisions. The authority has not said that its action amounts to a wider account of the conduct examined in the criminal proceedings; it has said that it will take no further action against these individuals in relation to this matter.
The four cases sit within the prosecutions concerning LIBOR and EURIBOR, the benchmark interest rates that were once used widely across financial markets. The benchmarks mattered because they fed into the pricing of a vast range of loans, derivatives and other financial products. Their importance helps explain why the criminal cases, and the regulatory action that followed them, carried such weight for the individuals involved and for confidence in market oversight.
What the courts changed
Jonathan Mathew, Philippe Moryoussef and Colin Bermingham were among five former Barclays traders whose convictions were overturned by the Court of Appeal on 7 October. Christian Bittar’s conviction was overturned two days later. The court outcomes followed earlier litigation involving two other former traders, Tom Hayes and Carlo Palombo.
In those earlier cases, the Supreme Court found that the jury directions had been incorrect. The Serious Fraud Office subsequently said it would not oppose the appeals brought by the five people convicted after trial. In Bittar’s case, the agency argued for a different outcome but said it respected the Court of Appeal’s decision.
Those details matter because an overturned conviction and a regulatory ban are different legal and administrative measures. The Court of Appeal decisions dealt with the convictions. The FCA has now addressed the separate consequences created by its own enforcement decisions. Its announcement does not reopen the criminal appeals, nor does it set out a new market-conduct policy.
Why the removal of Final Notices matters
Final Notices are formal public records of FCA enforcement outcomes. Taking them down alongside the bans is therefore more than a technical change to an internal register. It removes the public regulatory documents associated with action that the FCA says rested on convictions that no longer stand.
For regulated firms, the development is a reminder that criminal and regulatory processes can run in parallel while remaining legally distinct. A criminal appeal can alter the factual or legal foundation of a separate regulatory decision, but the regulator must still decide what follows for its own records and restrictions. Here, the FCA has made that decision for four named people and for this particular matter.
The authority also referred to action it took last year after the Supreme Court quashed the convictions of Hayes and Palombo. It had discontinued proceedings against Hayes and revoked Palombo’s ban. The latest decision extends that response to four further former traders whose convictions were later overturned by the Court of Appeal.
For the wider financial sector, the immediate change is clear: four historic FCA bans and their associated public notices have been revoked. The announcement is consequential for the people named, but it should be read with the limits the regulator set out. It resolves its action in relation to these four individuals and this matter, rather than offering a broader reassessment of benchmark-rate enforcement.
