The Metropolitan Police has set out changes to emergency call-handling training after an inquest examined a fatal collision on the A13 in Rainham and found that officers had been sent to the wrong location of an earlier crash.
Newly published documents describe how confusion about the first incident’s location preceded a second collision on 15 July 2024. Sachin Kalia, 19, Davina Kaur Ruprah, 24, and Kiranjeet Sagoo, 36, died at the scene near the Wennington junction.
A jury concluded in March 2026 that the fatal collision could have been avoided if officers had been given the correct location and arrived in sufficient time to clear the first incident. It also said the collision could have been avoided if a van involved in that earlier crash had not been left on the central reservation.
The jury found that the deaths were caused by a road traffic collision after a driver lost control while travelling at high speed in adverse weather. The coroner’s assessment was that the later collision was likely to have been avoided had officers attended the correct location. That assessment does not mean their attendance would have guaranteed a different outcome.
Two collisions on the westbound road
The first incident happened at about 9.12pm, when a BMW 1 Series collided with a Ford Transit. The coroner’s report said the BMW’s driver had been exceeding the speed limit and lost control.
The van came to rest on the central reservation, protruding slightly into the third lane. The report described it as a hazard, while noting that several vehicles passed it safely.
At 9.19pm a passing driver called the Metropolitan Police and twice identified the first collision as being at the Wennington junction between the A13 and A1306. The call handler did not enter the junction name in the remarks section, while the computer system listed the Dagenham junction as a possible location.
Officers were sent to the wrong location and found no trace of the incident, even after checking one junction in either direction. The coroner said that, if they had reached the correct scene before the second collision, they were trained to position their vehicle to slow traffic and might also have removed the van.
At 10.04pm a BMW 4 Series approached the earlier collision site at well above the speed limit, braked and went out of control. The coroner considered it likely that excessive speed and wet weather caused the car to aquaplane and hit the Transit.
A separate emergency call was made to Essex Police. Its call handler incorrectly placed the incident in that force’s area, although the location was within the Metropolitan Police area. The coroner said Essex staff did not contact the Metropolitan Police and that Essex had no resources available to respond before the second collision.
Concerns over location checks
The joint inquest ended on 16 March 2026. Later that month the area coroner issued prevention of future deaths reports to both forces, raising concerns about the way emergency locations were established. The documents were published on 12 November.
In the report to the Metropolitan Police, the coroner said the incorrect recording had been identified later on the evening of the collisions, but the call handler was not given feedback, training or additional supervision at that stage.
The force acknowledged the recording error and the lack of immediate supervisory intervention. Its response said a subsequent review found that the initial computer record had not been linked to the main incident record, meaning supervisors could not see the discrepancy at the time. The handler first became aware of the mistake during a meeting with an inquest team on 24 July 2025, the response said.
The coroner also warned that mobile phone network location data could be imprecise and that relying too heavily on it risked diverting attention from what callers said. The precise location was eventually established using the What3Words location system.
Training and supervision
In its response, the Metropolitan Police said What3Words had been incorporated into its 2026 training syllabus and that new call handlers were trained to use its location codes. Staff already had access to the system through the force’s network.
The response said guidance and training had been updated so that callers’ verbal descriptions were prioritised and mobile phone mast data treated as a supplementary indicator. Operators were expected to question inconsistencies and seek clarification. Training had also been strengthened in mapping, identifying roads and landmarks, and using digital tools to check locations.
The call handler had voluntarily contributed to training material about the consequences of incomplete recording. The response described plans to embed that material in academy training and staff development. It also said supervisory expectations had been reinforced for reviewing computer records where several calls might relate to one incident.
These measures are the force’s account of actions taken and planned in response to the coroner’s concerns. Publication of the response does not establish the date on which every change was completed or prove how the measures will perform in a future emergency.