The European Commission has published a framework setting out how animal, environmental and human health authorities can work together to prevent and respond to avian influenza that can pass from animals to people.
The document brings existing European Union rules, policies and response mechanisms into one place. It also describes how responsibilities and measures could differ in a series of scenarios, from infections in animals to sustained transmission between people. The framework is a preparedness document, not an announcement that such human transmission is occurring.
Published on 11 November, the accompanying announcement identifies opportunities to improve coordination, surveillance, workplace protection and communication. The Commission staff working document itself is dated 10 November.
Avian influenza viruses circulate in wild birds and can infect poultry and other kept birds. Some can also infect mammals, including people. An infection that passes from animals to humans is described as zoonotic. Because the disease can cross those boundaries, the framework takes a “One Health” approach, linking work on animal health, public health and the environment.
Existing measures and possible responses
The framework describes legislation and arrangements already in place across animal health, food safety, occupational health and the management of serious cross-border health threats. It is intended to provide a common reference for national authorities, the Commission and other partners, rather than reporting a new outbreak or announcing a new general rule for bird keepers.
Its first scenario concerns outbreaks in animals. Where an outbreak occurs in animal species already covered by relevant rules, the response includes applying animal-health measures and assessing the implications for people exposed to the animals. For species not listed under those arrangements, the framework describes investigation and measures based on the risks to animal health, public health and food safety.
A second scenario covers sporadic human cases or limited transmission between people. It describes investigation, contact tracing and monitoring where appropriate, alongside closer coordination between veterinary and public health services. These are scenarios for planning; their inclusion does not establish that either situation is happening now in the EU.
A third scenario considers sustained transmission between people. In that situation, the framework envisages scaling up the public health response and activating pandemic arrangements as necessary. The existence of a plan for that possibility is not a prediction that it will occur.
Monitoring and protecting workers
The Commission identifies cross-sector surveillance as an area where the approach could be strengthened. The factsheet accompanying the framework refers to closer laboratory collaboration and exploring whether EU information systems need to be joined up. These are avenues for further work, not confirmation that a new shared system has already been built.
Information from wild birds, kept animals and exposed people can serve different purposes. Veterinary authorities may investigate animal infections, while public health teams consider whether people have been exposed and what follow-up is appropriate. Sharing relevant information allows the separate services to assess the same situation together.
The framework also points to practical tools for protecting workers and to consideration of seasonal and zoonotic influenza vaccination for occupationally exposed groups, based on national risk assessments. That is not a blanket vaccination requirement, and the document does not say that every worker will receive the same intervention.
Other opportunities include developing joint risk-assessment models using the expertise of relevant EU agencies and coordinating risk-based communication. Those measures are presented as ways to strengthen collaboration; their inclusion does not establish that all have been implemented.
Current risk and the wider picture
EU public health authorities assess the risk from the H5N1 viruses currently circulating in Europe as low for the general public and low to moderate for people occupationally or otherwise exposed to infected animals or contaminated environments. The framework does not announce a change to that classification. Low risk is not the same as no risk, and the assessment differs for people with direct exposure.
The Commission says about 7,000 detections of highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses were reported in wild birds in Europe between October 2025 and August 2026. That figure counts reported detections, not all infections in wild birds. The Commission also notes the first detection of avian influenza in dairy cows in 2024 and sporadic infections in people as part of the background to preparedness.
The framework addresses how authorities could coordinate if circumstances change, while drawing on measures that already exist. It does not itself establish a pandemic, an outbreak in a particular place or a new public health emergency.
