The General Assembly has returned nuclear disarmament to the centre of its agenda at a high-level plenary held on 29 September, as delegates were reminded that conflict, strained arms-control arrangements and threats around nuclear sites are adding to an already difficult security picture.
The meeting marked the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. Its immediate purpose was not to announce a new agreement. Instead, it set out the gaps that delegates say need urgent attention: the absence of a successor to the New START treaty, weakened confidence in multilateral processes and continuing risks to nuclear safety where wars are being fought.
Conflict forms part of the setting
The Assembly’s live update placed the discussion against rising tensions, the effects of extreme weather and strikes on nuclear infrastructure in Iran and Ukraine. That framing did not assign responsibility for any incident. It did underline why the safety of nuclear facilities and the rules designed to restrain nuclear risks were being discussed alongside weapons stockpiles and treaty obligations.
Recent reporting to the international nuclear body has described continuing safety pressures in Ukraine. The Zaporizhzhia plant, for example, had experienced repeated losses of off-site power, making dependable electricity and access for safety work a continuing concern. The point made at the Assembly was broader: conflict around nuclear infrastructure can create risks that extend beyond the immediate battlefield and make restraint, access and independent verification more important.
Pressure to restore arms-control guardrails
Delegates were told that the global inventory stood at more than 12,000 nuclear warheads in January, with an estimated 2,100 to 2,200 maintained on high operational alert. The Assembly president said the overall stockpile was expected to begin growing again as newer warheads enter arsenals faster than older ones are dismantled.
Attention also focused on the expiry of New START on 5 February without a replacement. The agreement had put binding limits on the strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia. Its lapse means there are no longer binding limits of that kind for the two countries, a situation delegates described as a significant loss of predictability.
The Secretary-General called on Washington and Moscow to negotiate a successor framework. The proposed purpose was practical: restore verifiable limits, transparency and predictability, rather than leave strategic arsenals without agreed constraints. Delegates also heard calls for stronger crisis communication and for steps that reduce the chance that a confrontation, mistake or miscalculation becomes more dangerous.
Safeguards and verification remain central
The meeting treated the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as the main framework connecting three tasks: preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, pursuing disarmament and allowing peaceful nuclear cooperation. Delegates were urged to implement all three parts fully. They were also told that safeguards and verification work need cooperation, access, and adequate resources if it is to remain independent and effective.
That emphasis matters in the current climate. Safeguards are not a substitute for political agreements or for the protection of civilian nuclear sites during war. They are, however, part of the means by which the international community can assess nuclear material and activities, reduce uncertainty and maintain confidence in commitments. The Assembly’s discussion linked that technical work to the wider need for trust between states.
Participants also pointed to a stalled review of the non-proliferation treaty, which ended without a consensus outcome, and to the continuing need for concrete disarmament measures. The measures discussed included reducing the role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines, lowering operational readiness and making reductions transparent, verifiable and irreversible.
No single meeting can resolve the conflicts or strategic rivalries behind these concerns. The 29 September discussion nevertheless put a clear diplomatic marker down: nuclear safety in wartime, arms-control limits and effective safeguards cannot be treated as separate issues. For delegates, rebuilding those guardrails is a necessary part of reducing the risk of a nuclear crisis.
