France and Germany have asked the European Union to move more quickly when trading partners are judged to be distorting markets, proposing a new response tool that could ultimately restrict access to the bloc’s single market. French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz sent a joint letter and accompanying policy paper to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on 5 October. The proposal is framed for use against any country, rather than naming a particular target.
The leaders say systemic practices such as dumping, widespread subsidies and limits on currency convertibility threaten Europe’s industrial base and warrant a stronger response. Their paper calls for existing trade-defence powers to be used faster and more broadly, including more investigations and approaches that can address pressure across whole sectors rather than only individual products or firms. Chemicals, polyethylene terephthalate and hybrid vehicles are identified as areas of concern for imports.
The paper also asks the Commission to develop two additional instruments. One would encourage diversification of supplies and reduce dependence on a single source for critical goods. The other would provide a route to limit single-market access for a state that undermines fair conditions through political or economic measures. The paper does not specify a detailed trigger or list the countermeasures that would follow, leaving important design choices unresolved.
A central part of the proposal is how quickly action could be authorised. The Commission’s proposed countermeasures, the paper says, should take effect unless a qualified majority of member states votes to oppose them. That would make it harder for a small number of governments to block a response than under procedures requiring broad or unanimous support. German officials have suggested the Commission might be able to act within days, though the letter does not establish a binding timetable.
This proposed activation process should not be confused with the creation of the new instrument itself. Any legislation establishing it would still have to be approved by both EU governments and the European Parliament. The initiative is therefore a request to begin designing a legal mechanism, not a new power already in force. Existing trade-defence rules would remain relevant while that work proceeds.
China is an evident backdrop to the debate: European officials have raised concerns about import pressure and trade imbalances, and EU leaders are due to discuss those issues at a Brussels summit in mid-October. But the Franco-German paper presents the instrument in general terms. Its stated rationale includes market distortions and supply vulnerabilities, not a country-specific sanction or an immediate move against China.
Paris and Berlin had already called in July for systematic use of existing EU instruments and new proposals on trade defence and economic security, including a resilience measure to reduce critical supply dependencies. The October paper develops that earlier direction into a request for a specific rapid-response mechanism and a possible limit on market access. Its political weight comes from the two governments presenting a shared position ahead of the leaders’ discussion, but the initiative remains at the proposal stage.
The initiative signals that Paris and Berlin want trade policy to respond more rapidly as economic dependence and market access become part of geopolitical bargaining. Its practical effect will depend on what counts as a systemic distortion, what evidence would trigger a case, how affected trading partners could challenge a decision and what measures could be imposed. Those details are not settled by the joint paper. Member states and MEPs will have to weigh the promised speed against legal certainty, proportionality and the risk of escalation before a new instrument can become law.
